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The study of parties that label themselves as Marxist-Leninist has, for the most part been subsumed in the exploration of the broader radical (or, far) left tradition in the post-1989 period. In an attempt to bridge this gap in the recent literature on radical left parties, this article attempts to uncover the (non) distinctiveness of Marxism-Leninism by studying empirically two European parties that are self-labeled as Marxist-Leninist – the Greek (KKE) and Portuguese (PCP) Communist parties. The central question we explore is whether there are significant similarities between these parties, so as to allow us to speak of Marxism-Leninism’s distinctiveness today. Overall, the two parties studied here have enough in common to testify to Marxism-Leninism’s ongoing distinctiveness with several qualifications, especially concerning ideology.
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Despite a recent upsurge in publications on the European radical left, we know little about the current state of one of its most historically dominant strains; that is, of Marxism-Leninism. The study of Marxist-Leninist parties has been subsumed in the exploration of the broader radical left (Gomez et al. 2016; Hudson 2012; 2000; March 2011; 2008; Bale and Dunphy 2011; Dunphy and Bale 2011; Dunphy 2004; Olsen et al. 2010; March and Mudde 2005). Studies of what March calls the ‘extreme left’ have focused largely on their electoral fortunes (March 2011, Backes and Moreau 2008, Lazar 2002). Overall, scholars have spent little time investigating whether parties that label themselves as Marxist-Leninist are actually a distinct group in terms of theory and practice. 
Recent attempts to ‘map’ the subgroups within the radical left have classified these parties as ‘Conservative Communists’ and recognized that they are different from ‘Reformed Communists’, and that differences between these parties grew after the events of 1989-1991 (March 2011, 2008). There has not, however, been a systematic comparative analysis of Marxist-Leninist parties since the 1980s. Nevertheless, developing an understanding of them are important, since they have at times been crucial players in their countries’ histories: active in revolutions, and in resistance movements that fought against dictatorships, 
This article is supposed to fill the significant gaps in our knowledge about Marxist-Leninist parties by studying two of the last of such parties that have a substantial presence in parliament in Western Europe: the Portuguese Communist Party (PCP) and the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). We focus on their evolution since the dissolution of the Soviet Bloc in 1991. These cases have also played a leading role in attempting to develop links between Marxist-Leninist parties through the International Meeting of Communist and Workers’ parties that the KKE first organized in 1998. By analyzing these cases, we develop an analytical framework for building comparisons with the wider population of self-labeled Marxist-Leninist parties. This includes parties in Slovakia, Russia, Ukraine and Latvia, and the electorally successful cases of Cyprus and Moldova (March 2012), numerous miniscule parties and parties beyond Europe.  While other ‘reform Communist’ parties, such as those in Italy and Spain, broke with Marxism-Leninism, the PCP and KKE have remained committed to this teaching, thus enabling us to study the similarities and differences between these parties (March 2011). 
Although the popularity of KKE and PCP has declined, they are still often able to gain five-ten per cent of the vote at elections. This is sometimes enough to prevent the formation of left-wing coalition governments. Both parties retain large memberships and have been at the forefront of protests against austerity measures. Moreover, it is puzzling that the KKE and PCP did not break with Communism when other West European Communist Parties (WECPs) were more adaptive and made more substantial reforms to their programmes (Botella and Ramiro 2003). Other radical left parties have also found inclusion in government and have been ‘brought in from the cold’ after they sacrificed ideological purity (Dunphy and Bale 2011). This makes it necessary to re-examine those parties that resisted change. Studying their relative continuity in the face of external pressures can reveal a lot about party change itself (Keith 2011). According to Backes and Moreau (2008: 554), Marxist-Leninist parties ‘characterize themselves, as revolutionary, working-class oriented, are active with trade unions, internationalist, anti-imperialist, and anti-fascist’. March’s attempt to ‘map’ different categories of radical left parties goes further and reports basic similarities between ‘Conservative Communists’, including their predisposition to revolution, the working class membership and class conflict (March 2011).
These studies treat Marxist-Leninist parties as a distinct group within the left. However, this is at odds with reports of the increasing ideological and strategic differences within Marxist-Leninist parties, as they reinterpreted Leninist principles (Lazar 1988). It also runs contrary to findings that the differences between parties in Southern Europe have grown since the 1970s.  A lack of empirical analysis means that we need a framework that can enable systematic comparisons of Marxist-Leninist parties and that would help to uncover the differences that exist among them. 
We avoid the normative question of how Marxism-Leninism should be practiced. The central question we explore is whether there are significant similarities among Marxist-Leninist parties, so as to allow us to speak of Marxism-Leninism’s distinctiveness today?  Moreover, we ask whether Marxist-Leninist parties provide a basis for a coherent grouping within the Communist movement. Have the parties made any failed attempts to change or can we uncover understated forms of adaptation? Finally, have they ‘softened’ in ideological terms like other radical left parties? (March and Mudde 2005; Ramiro and Botella 2003). 
Our research is based on both the rich details available from the secondary literature as well as primary materials (analysis of party documents and elite/expert interviews) to provide a comparative assessment of the nature of the PCP and KKE.
The first section of the paper identifies the reasons why we can expect some diversity between these two parties. We then outline a comparative framework for analyzing Marxist-Leninist parties. Subsequently, this framework is used to compare the development of the KKE and PCP since 1991. In the conclusion, larger questions about the radical left and party adaptation are raised. We uncover the factors that have shaped the ideological, political and organizational differences between the two parties. Our findings have also suggested that while generally the KKE and the PCP are Marxist-Leninist parties, but they have their own qualifications. In particular, the parties have more in common in terms of their organization and political behavior rather than in their ideological discourse. Therefore, there is a need for a more nuanced understanding of the universe of Marxist-Leninist parties

Marxism-Leninism: Is it a specific historical ideological strand?
Lenin’s reformulation of Marxism asserts that the Party should take revolutionary action on behalf of the working class to build a dictatorship of the proletariat and a socialist society, which legitimates revolutionary action (Lane 1998). Accordingly, a party of professional revolutionaries should seize power on behalf of the proletariat and destroy the economic and political structures of capitalism (Clarke 1997). The state structure is rejected as being part of capitalist development. Involvement in parliamentary politics is avoided or exercised in aim of exposing the limitations of rival political parties (Valenta 1989: 41).
Marxist-Leninist parties used to have much in common. The parties originated from the left-wing of social democratic parties; espoused international proletarianism and were loyal to the Soviet Union (USSR). The parties also used the Leninist basis of internal party organization called democratic centralism, along with a mass-party model (Bull 1995, Waller 1988).  In particular, WECPs were urged by the Comintern to seek alliances through periods that lacked revolutionary momentum and, to prepare the revolution by radicalizing the masses through constitutional methods. 
We can, however, hypothesize that these parties have taken divergent trajectories. First, in the 1950s, intense conflict emerged within the international communist movement when Trotskyists and Maoists challenged the Stalinist interpretation of Marxism-Leninism (Lane 1998: 280). In the 1970s, scholars reported increasing diversity as ‘Eurocommunist’ parties challenged the orthodox view of Marxism-Leninism as promoted by the USSR and accepted capitalist liberal democratic institutions as a means to promote socialism (Narkiewicz 1990; Mujal-Leon 1981). By the late 1980s, the breakup of the traditional West European Communist ‘party family’ was apparent (Waller and Fennema 1988, Bull and Heywood, 1994).
Second, Marxist-Leninist parties function in different historical contexts, encountering different political opportunity structures, cleavages, issues and opponents. In the absence of a ‘guiding centre’, following the collapse of the USSR, domestic considerations may have played a more important role in shaping the parties’ strategic calculations (Charalambous 2013: 5). The parties became freer to adapt Communism to their national situations. Finally, the tensions the parties encountered following the foreign policy of the USSR and domestic political demands ended (Balabanidis 2015).  

Theoretical framework 
Party family scholars usually classify parties on the basis of ideology. Such an approach, however, overlooks important similarities and differences in terms of Marxist-Leninist parties’ organizations and electoral behaviour.  Therefore, we seek to classify the parties along three dimensions to highlight the potential for intra-family diversity.   These three areas of party activity derived from the central parts of Lenin’s contribution to Marxism: official ideology, political behaviour (in Lenin’s terms, ‘tactics’) and organizational structure. Communist parties were provided with clear instructions in these three areas, providing us with a useful basis for comparison. Most WECPs also adapted to the events of 1989 by dropping Marxist-Leninist theory, embracing social democratic or green parties in electoral coalitions or mergers and abandoning democratic centralism. We study these three dimensions, therefore, to respond to the need for a holistic analysis for categorizing parties into distinct groups (Mair and Mudde 1998). Therefore, we analyze communist parties on their own terms because Marxism-Leninism has been an ideological, political, and organizational toolkit for these parties. 
Within each dimension of analysis we focus on a wide range of analytical units. As we explain below these reflect historical divisions around the ‘true nature’ of Marxism-Leninism, as well as recent issues that have become significant for radical left parties. The framework thus incorporates pressures that Marxist-Leninists have encountered to respond to local, national, regional and global issues (Freeden 2001). A general matrix for the comparative framework of Marxist-Leninist parties is presented in Table 1.  Subsequently we use this framework to compare the KKE and PCP. 
TABLE 1 (here)
Official Ideology
By analysing the KKE and PCP we ask whether Marxist-Leninist parties share a common view of the ‘socialist’ past and the dissolution of the USSR. We then analyse the fundamental factors that political ideologies develop around – a critique of the present, a vision for the future, and a plan of action (Freeden 2003: 32). Therefore, we look to their theories regarding global capitalism and views on liberal democracy; their perceptions of the Communist party’s role in the transition to socialism; their methods for socialist transformation; and their views on the teleological nature of Communism. We also examine the parties’ main policy pledges on themes of domestic economic, social and foreign policy (including stances on the EU and NATO). Working this way allows us to assess the coherence between parties’ long-term, system-related beliefs and their short-term programmatic positions (Mair and Mudde 1998).

Political behaviour and tactics
Here we focus on whether Marxist-Leninists share a common approach to struggling against capitalism. We investigate their respective strategies towards party systems, governing, and alliance seeking, at national and regional/local levels. Lenin placed little emphasis on this distinction. Yet, there is now evidence that national elections and local/regional elections are based on different issues and that parties respond differently to competition within these arenas (Schakel 2013). 
In the first half of the twentieth century the international Communist movement was characterized by a significant level of solidarity (Sassoon 1996). If the Marxist-Leninist principle of internationalism is to be taken seriously, then we should expect these parties to cooperate at a transnational (for example European) level. Since scholars have noted that the PCP and KKE have struggled to develop transnational links for example in working with other radical left parties in the European Parliament (March 2011; Dunphy 2004; Bell 1998), we ask what is holding them back and examine the various degrees to which they cooperate. Furthermore, we ask how the parties responded to the emergence of transnational left-wing social movements that in some respects share Communist principles.

Organizational structure
Are there particular rules, internal procedures, linkage strategies vis-à-vis civil society and common forms of societal mobilization among Marxist-Leninist parties? Despite a long tradition of work on the internal party organizations of WECPs (Duverger 1954), scholars have made little effort to study democratic centralism from a comparative perspective since the 1980s (Waller 1988). Our classification establishes room for future studies to investigate how organizational factors may have shaped adaptation in the other two areas of study. There are signs that such factors have been important in the adaptation of WECPs (Keith 2011, Lisi and Jalali 2012), as well as in parties across the political spectrum (Harmel and Janda 1994).
To fill these gaps in our knowledge, we examine whether Marxist-Leninist parties have a common conception of democratic centralism. History suggests that this is unlikely. As Waller concluded (1988, 1981: 133), in the only systematic and historical studies of democratic centralism, this organizational practice ‘has meant different things at different times to different people and different Marxist-Leninist parties’. However, what Waller termed as the ‘orthodox version of democratic centralism’ did play a highly significant role in Communist practice. This generally had several common characteristics:
	The application of the elective principle to all leading organs of the party from the highest to the lowest.
	Periodic accountability of party organs (leading bodies) to their respective party organizations.
	Strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority.
	The absolutely binding character of the decisions of the higher organs upon the lower organs and upon party members. 
	No horizontal dialogue and a ban on factions.
Research has highlighted that the first two ‘democratic’ principles were frequently lost as elections were rarely held (or indirectly controlled by particular individuals) and the latter centralist principles took over (Waller 1981: 12).  In practice, this meant that power was concentrated in the hands of the party’s top leaders. This regularly enabled domineering leaders to engage in one-man management. Moreover, bloated leadership bodies, became little more than rubber stamps. There were few mechanisms by which to hold the leadership accountable, as members were taught to take pride in upholding unity and had limited freedom of expression in party publications (Waller 1988, 1981; McInnes 1975; Von Beyme 1975).
We know little about the type of democratic centralism that Marxist-Leninist parties practice today. Thus, we analyse whether the PCP and KKE still apply the principles identified by Waller’s ‘orthodox democratic centralism’.  The dissolution of the Soviet Bloc has been attributed to the dominance and corruption of a party-centred nomenklatura. This has led to the democratization of decision-making processes in other parties (Scarrow et al. 2000). We ask whether such developments affected Marxist-Leninist parties. To build an understanding of the relations between party leaders and members in Marxist-Leninist parties, we analyse three relevant aspects of internal party organisation; members’ rights, recruitment processes, and the role and power of party bodies in decision-making (including the Central Committee, Political Bureau and party cells). 
Second, social movements have become increasingly significant in radical left politics (Hudson 2012). Lenin was often suspicious towards spontaneous uprisings, which lacked class consciousness, or the organizational structure needed to stage a revolution (Levant 2012; Lenin 1902). It is, therefore, necessary to ask whether Marxist-Leninist parties have forged links with the anti-globalization movement, anti-austerity protests, post-materialist groups and other social organizations. Tiersky (1983) pointedly called Communist parties’ relations with ancillary organizations, ‘democratic centralism outside the party’. Therefore, we analyse the extent to which Marxist-Leninist parties still seek to infiltrate and control but also remain unaffected from other organizations. In short, do they enjoy reciprocal relationships with non-party groups?

Official Ideology - World view 
Views on the dissolution of the USSR
We begin our analysis of the KKE and PCP by examining the approach that they have taken towards the collapse of the USSR. The PCP supported the failed coup in the USSR in August 1991 (Patricio and Stoleroff 1993: 19). It claims that Gorbachev and Perestroika betrayed socialism, and caused the collapse of the USSR (Cunhal 1995). The PCP did, however, criticize the USSR for deviating from the Communist ideal in several ways. These included an excessive centralization of power in the hands of the bureaucracy; a repressive state; and an overly statist economy that reduced workers’ incentives for productivity. It also criticized a failure to maintain links to the masses.
The KKE officially supported Perestroika despite internal divisions (Smith 1993). After the split with the Coalition of the Left and Progress (SYN) in 1991, the party rejected the reforms in the USSR. The KKE now praises the overall contribution of the USSR to socialism and its 2009 congress vindicated the Stalinist economic policy programme. It argues that the USSR did not collapse primarily due to its structural flaws but because pressure from ‘counter-revolutionary’ forces inside the CPSU led to a deviation from Stalinism. 
According to the KKE, the CPSU forgot important principles (KKE 2009). In particular, it downgraded the advancement of Communist cadres with working class backgrounds (KKE 1995). The KKE rejects notions that the USSR was undemocratic. Such views are for the most part dismissed as attempts to undermine the legitimacy of socialism by bourgeois intellectuals (KKE 2009).
        
Analyses of Global Capitalism
Both parties use Leninist terminology to describe globalization. This is seen as the final ‘monopoly’ or ‘imperialist’ stage of capitalism as global links have developed between international corporations and governments. Globalization presents a new global capitalist offensive that has intensified the exploitation of workers. Furthermore, the ability of nation states to participate in decisions taken at a global level is unequal and depends on the strength of national capital and military power (PCP 2012, KKE 2009). The PCP criticizes the growing foreign domination of major sections of Portugal’s economy (PCP 2012). In recent years it has identified mounting dangers from capitalist imperialism by NATO (PCP, 2008; De Sousa, 2006).  In a similar to the KKE manner, the PCP also associates the struggle to defend national sovereignty with class struggle (Guerrero 2012).
The main enemy is, however, not considered to be globalization or neo-liberalism, but capitalism. The language used by the parties in regards to capitalism shares many resemblances, like emphasis on the contradictions between capital and labour. For example, the KKE (2004) argues: ‘the people produce the wealth that belongs to them. But capital receives it. Here lies the root of the problem’ (KKE 2004). Likewise, the PCP claims that: ‘Only socialism, with the workers’ taking power...with the social property of the main means of production...has the potential...to provide solutions for humankind’s great problems’ (PCP 2012). In particular, it is the nation state itself that continues to promote the interests of large-scale capitalists. The parties believe that the proletariat’s struggle against capitalism is primarily a national one (Liosis 2002, Cunhal 1995). 
            According to the KKE, the significance of the nation-state has not withered away and it remains an expression of big capitalist interests. The party’s 16th Congress stated that: ‘The role of inter-state monopoly regulations versus that of state monopoly regulations at the national level has been reinforced and upgraded; but state monopoly regulations not only do not lose their role but also act as a support mechanism and necessary complement to inter-state monopoly regulations’ (KKE 2009 cited in Liosis 2002). Overall, the influence of nation states in decision making at the global level is seen to depend on the power of national capital and a state’s military power (Liosis 2002). The struggle of the proletariat at the national level is the KKE’s primary concern.  
         Similarly, the PCP is fiercely critical of the growing foreign domination of major sections of Portugal’s economy and the subjection of Portuguese interests to foreign interests. In a similar to the KKE fasion, it argues that: ‘In [the] face of imperialism, the struggle for the defence of national sovereignty and independence is an expression of class struggle’ (Guerrero 2012).

Teleology 
The PCP and KKE appear to be similar in their use of the basic principles of Marxism including teleology and revolution.  In particular, workers are seen to play the primary role in rising up to make a socialist society, under the guidance of the Communist party, which acts as the vanguard of the working class. In the PCP, the leadership deliberately restricts the influence of middle class and intellectual cadres who might water down the party’s ideology (Keith 2011, Cunha 1991: 356). After 2004 the PCP policy increasingly campaigned on the working-class roots of its General secretary Jerónimo de Sousa. The KKE did something analogous through a change in its organizational strategy, under its General Secretary Nicos Zachariades, in the 1940s (Vernadakis and Mavris 1988). In view of the diversification of the working class, the interests of the proletariat are seen as having general relevance to small and medium-scale farmers, intellectuals, employees in small-scale industry and services, artisans, pensioners, disabled people, women and the young (PCP 2012; KKE 2013).  
There is however, significant ideological divergence between the parties. Following the 1974 Carnation revolution in Portugal which overthrew the Estado Novo authoritarian regime, the PCP pursued a strategy of ‘institutional occupation’ that allowed it to gain influence in local administrations, trade unions, and the media (Bosco 2001: 336).​[1]​ Portugal’s history and in particular, the experience of revolution left their mark on party ideology. Overthrowing the fascist Salazar/Caetano dictatorship and the establishment of political democracy became inseparable from further revolutionary changes in the economic sphere and in asserting national sovereignty (PCP 2012). 
The PCP says little about its envisioned ‘telos’, other than that it will be characterized by the absence of class conflict. It will also be based on economic and political democracy (PCP 2102). Since the late 1980s, Cunhal’s vague theory of ‘Advanced democracy’ has dominated party thinking. This has led to disagreement among scholars over the PCP’s aims. Some, such as Bosco (2001), interpreted the introduction of this new theory as a sign of adaptation and ideological flexibility. Others, including Cunha (2008) and Gaspar (1991), see ‘Advanced democracy’ as a rhetorical attempt to shroud the party’s revolutionary aims in ambiguity. The PCP’s Marxism-Leninism and commitment to Communism remain fundamentally unchanged and incompatible with liberal democracy (Cunha 1991: 376). The concept may fail to reconcile liberal democratic thinking with the long-term goal of Communism. It does, however, indicate that the PCP felt the need to slightly adjust its narratives on revolution in light of events in the USSR. 
In contrast, the KKE expresses its ambitions more openly and through more ideologically driven catchphrases. It does little even to pay lip-service to ideas of governing in capitalism.  It is noteworthy that, unlike the PCP, the KKE says a great deal about what ‘genuine’ Communism should be like. The recent defence of Stalin’s industrial policies tells us much about the KKE’s Communist vision. The KKE criticises Soviet economic policy from the 1950s onwards, for the ‘disempowerment of central planning’ (KKE 2009). These changes are seen to have led to the faulty interpretation and application of socialist principles of economic management and principles of ‘from each according to his abilities, to each according to his contribution’ (KKE 2009).  The party envisages a central role of the revolutionary socialist state in socializing the means of production under the guidance of the communist party (KKE 2009).
  
Liberal democracy and party competition
The PCP and KKE have different approaches to multi-party politics and political representation. For the KKE, multi-party politics is undesirable and its programme fails to recognize that other parties could exist alongside the communist party during the transition to socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat is understood to be the only way of constructing socialism, with multi-party politics being rejected as a class-based conception of democracy. 
Maintaining a presence in elected institutions and contesting elections are legitimized by the argument that they allow the party to promote its ideas and to publically confront its enemies. In contrast, the PCP historically avoided referring to the ‘dictatorship’ of the proletariat. Such phrases were believed to transmit the wrong signals to the people who have experienced dictatorship. In recent years, however, the leadership has been unencumbered by reformers. It has begun employing technical Marxist-Leninist terminology in campaigns, albeit, far less than the KKE. 
The PCP also differs from the Greek case because it pays lip-service to political freedoms in the pre-Communist stage of ‘Advanced democracy’. These freedoms include the right to form rights to expression and vote; democratic elections; more participatory and direct democracy and rights to be elected (PCP 2012). It remains unclear, however, if the PCP would allow governments to alternate following elections, or rule out armed uprising (Gaspar 1991). It is not specified whether liberal freedoms and multiparty politics would still exist under Communism (Cunha 1991: 376).

Method for socialism
Until recently, both parties displayed a patient approach to revolution and argued that there were two ‘stages of struggle’ based on a preparatory, transitional stage of upheaval and then socialism itself. Before the KKE split with SYN in 1991, it aimed to retain the potential for cooperation with ‘progressive bourgeois strata’ (Vernadakis and Mavris 1988). On the one hand, the KKE portrayed itself as being revolutionary, but on the other, it acknowledged that the conditions for revolution were still developing. Nevertheless, it appears that the KKE has abandoned this two stage approach. Its 2013 congress concluded that Greece is ‘ready’ for socialism. The KKE’s new statute no longer calls for the working class to fight for the short-term goal of ‘anti-imperialist’ and ‘democratic changes’, but for an ‘anti-monopoly, anti-capitalist struggle for workers’ power’. 
There have been signs that the KKE was shifting towards a more orthodox approach to socialist construction since 2011 when in its ‘Essay of the KKE’s History: 1949-1968, Volume B’, the party critically examined its policy during the 1940s. Here the KKE criticized its earlier stances for substituting class struggle for the struggle for national independence; the promotion of patriotic rhetoric over class rhetoric and substituting anti-imperialist struggle for anti-capitalist struggle which it argued made a ‘faulty’ distinction between the patriotic and the unpatriotic capitalist class (KKE 2011).​[2]​ 




The KKE’s economic policy views anything related to the free market as being totally undesirable for the working-class. Socialism is both a long-term vision and a short-term demand. The KKE argues for full employment, wage and pension increases, the establishment of the thirty-five hour week, wages based on need rather than workers’ competitiveness, equal rights for foreign workers, provision for the unemployed, free healthcare, the creation of agricultural cooperatives, the legalization of immigrants, and a free education system (Charalambous 2013). In essence, the KKE’s pledges are conditional upon socialist transformation, rather than incremental reforms. 
The Portuguese communists share similar positions: full employment, increased economic planning, increased social ownership of the means of production; the redistribution of land from large estates to collective farms and small scale farmers; additional rights to strike; the abolition of short-term contracts; and improved healthcare. To preserve national independence, it wants to guarantee Portugal’s food and energy security, reduce its trade deficit and dependence on foreign debt. At the same time, the PCP’s policies are more pragmatic than those of the KKE. This is shown in the PCP’s desire to counter Portugal’s weak place in the economic world order through developing a more scientific economy and its service sector. In the short-term, it sees a significant role ‘the coexistence of State-run, self-managed, cooperative, collective, family and individually-run forms of private organization’ (PCP 2012).

Foreign Policy 
Both parties oppose NATO for being inherently aggressive. They reject the participation of their countries’ military forces in ‘imperialist wars’, criticize the Common Foreign and Security Policy, dismiss the idea of a European army, and call for the abolition of military foreign bases in their countries (Charalambous 2013, PCP 2012). The parties also reject the EU, World Bank and IMF as being capitalist, imperialist and militaristic. 
The PCP is also fundamentally opposed to the EU. It seeks cooperation between free and sovereign states with minimal formal ties outside of the single market (PCP 2012).  Its staunch pursuit of Portugal’s independence in international forums is premised on its conviction that full national sovereignty is required for workers enact revolutionary change (Guerrero 2012). The PCP’s short-term strategy, however, is again more pragmatic than that of the KKE. Since 1988, for example, the PCP has recognized that it is unrealistic to leave the European Community. Therefore, the PCP’s rejection of the EU finds little expression within its short-term proposals (Charalambous 2011: 310). Instead, the PCP focuses on renegotiating the terms of membership in an attempt to gain support from those disrupted by European integration (Dunphy 2004: 114). The PCP also welcomes more EU structural funds to develop Portugal’s economy and it seeks to democratize European institutions and to promote disarmament at EU level. In recent years, there is some evidence of ideological hardening in the PCP, and, for example, in 2008, at the onset of the crisis the party approved the policy of leaving the Euro. However, even this change represents a milder attitude than the KKE’s call for an immediate exit from the EU. The KKE views structural funds as a promotion of capitalism and the EU (and European inter-governmentalism) as being incompatible with revolutionary change and disarmament (Charalambous 2013; Verney 2011). 
TABLE TWO
Data on party positions gathered by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (2015) supports the argument that the KKE is more left-wing than the PCP. It also suggests that both parties have moved to the left in recent years. This is apparent on left-right, economic left-right and redistribution dimensions. The data also indicates that the PCP pays more attention to Green, alternative, and libertarian issues than the KKE. It also indicates that the KKE is more traditionalist, authoritarian and ‘nationalist’ on the Gal/Tan position.  

Political Behaviour - Domestic
Government-opposition dynamics
The PCP worked in provisional national governments in 1975-6, following Portugal’s Carnation Revolution and the KKE participated in a coalition government in 1988–90.  Since then, they have been generally unwilling to make ideological compromises needed to gain acceptance from mainstream parties. Instead, the parties focused on engaging in social protest, a strategy that has been unable to deliver many votes, but has allowed them to maintain a high public profile (Kalyvas and Maratzides 2003: 22). 
The two parties have encountered few opportunities to govern. Still, where these arose, they were mostly rejected. The PCP paid lip-service to governing but its refusal to moderate meant that the larger Socialist Party (PS) looked elsewhere for partners – even when the PS and PCP held a majority in parliament. In 1987 and 1995 the PCP failed to give parliamentary support to PS minority governments to gain influence and was unwilling to moderate to win over disgruntled PS voters (Cunha 2003:115, Bosco 2001: 366). Reformers in the PCP’s leadership sought cooperation among parties on the left in the late 1990s but orthodox elites blocked such a change.  The PCP’s leadership had long criticized the PS for being too right wing for it to be a viable coalition partner (De Sousa 2008). 
In Greece, the KKE’s exclusion from government partly stems from the majoritarian nature of the Greek electoral system. Until recently, mainstream parties have been able to govern alone. The KKE, however, rejected what appeared as an opportunity to participate in government during the 2012 elections. The weakening of bi-polarism in the Greek party system had provided potential for a left-wing coalition and SYRIZA (Coalition of the Radical Left) put forward a proposal for potential cooperation with other left parties.
 	During the 2008- economic crisis the KKE has sought to differentiate itself from SYRIZA on a number of policy areas, as well as in terms of overall ideological orientation. It has continued to identify SYRIZA as an expression of opportunism, itself a problem with roots in capitalism.  Following the January 2015 elections, when SYRIZA initially became the largest party but lacked a majority, the KKE refused to engage in coalition negotiations with its rival. In the subsequent elections of September 2015 when a significant number of politicians and activists left SYRIZA to form Popular Unity under the leadership of Panayiotis Lafazanis, the KKE also avoided any meaningful political dialogue with this new party and other potential allies from the extra-parliamentary left, such as ANTARSYA (Anti-Capitalist Left Cooperation for Subversion). 

Coalition seeking at national level
During the past two decades, both parties have generally sought to make alliances that they can dominate. The PCP contests elections as the Democratic Unity Coalition alongside independents, the Greens and Democratic Intervention. Rather than being a genuine attempt to work with other parties, its allies are tightly controlled and coordinated ‘front parties’ established to increase the PCP’s share of the vote (Cunha, 2008: 4). The PCP has also struggled to institutionalize relations with the anti-capitalist Left Bloc (BE) which was formed by leftists and PCP dissidents in 1999 (Keith 2011). The PCP was unwilling to work with the BE and PS in October 2012 in the leftist movement, the Democratic Assembly for the Alternative. However, following austerity measures by a centre right government (2011-2015), the PCP adopted a softer approach. It offered parliamentary support to a new minority PS and Left Bloc minority coalition government in 2016. It also held bilateral negotiations with the PS and Left Bloc with a view to mitigate further austerity measures. Nevertheless, the PCP still ruled out the opportunity to form a left wing coalition government. It remains to be seen whether negotiations with the PS and BE will become a regular feature of Portuguese politics and if they can provide significant opportunities for the PCP to influence government policy. 
Between 1974-91, the KKE cooperated with the social democratic Greek Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) on a variety of issues in parliament; it worked alongside it in the General Confederation of Workers of Greece and backed PASOK’s proposal for Christos Sartzetakis to become president in 1985 (Maratzides and Rori 2010). In 1988, the KKE also formed the political coalition Synaspismos (SYN) with Greek Left (E.AR) which was the successor party of the Eurocommunist Greek Communist Party (Interior) (KKE-es) groups (Kalyvas and Maratzides 2002: 673).  In 1991, the party withdrew from SYN and reformers were expelled or abandoned the KKE. These developments left it with a more orthodox leadership (Kalyvas and Maratzides 2003: 29) and allowed it to pursue a vociferous confrontational strategy.​[3]​  

Coalition seeking at the regional level
The parties are reluctant to work with other parties in regional or local level politics. From 1989–2001, the PCP formed a rare local alliance with the Socialist Party (PS) in the Lisbon municipal elections and gained control of the city administration in 1993. However, in 2005 negotiations collapsed as the PCP became increasingly sectarian and ideologically orthodox (Cunha 2008: 17). The PCP’s hostility to cooperation with other parties seems to have been significant. This stemmed from Secretary-General Cunhal’s belief that a strategy of left unity would result in the disappearance of the Communist parties (Cunhal 1995). It is also apparent that in 2012 the PCP rejected PS proposals for an alliance for local elections in Porto and Lisbon.  
The KKE’s electoral strategy at the regional level was initially based on cooperation with PASOK. It sought to penetrate political institutions to gain influence following its long absence from political competition (Maratzides and Rori 2010). Since the late 1990s, however, the KKE has eschewed such alliances, resulting in its marginalisation in large municipalities (Maratzides 2009: 268). The KKE also formed ad hoc alliances with DIKKI (Democratic Social Movement, a splinter group from PASOK) in the local elections of 2002 and 2006. DIKKI broke with the KKE and allied with SYRIZA after the KKE sought to control its affairs (Tzialas 2012). The KKE now sees local government as being less significant. It seems unwilling to make compromises to gain institutional influence (Eleftheriou 2011: 79). 

Political behaviour - Abroad
Transnational affiliations 
The parties retain strong links with other Marxist-Leninist parties through the International and European Meetings of Communist and Workers’ Parties and have bi-lateral links to minuscule Communist parties around the world. The PCP, for example, maintains relations and solidarity with the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and believes that Portugal can learn from its advances in building a socialist society (PCP Theses 2004). The KKE publishes the International Communist Review with tiny European communist parties and their Mexican and Venezuelan counterparts.
Communist parties in Europe have historically struggled to cooperate at the transnational level (Dunphy 2004). This is reflected by a series of shifting alliances at the European level and is demonstrated by the way in which the Italian Communist Party and a number of parties left the Communists and Allies in the European parliament in 1989.  In the past twenty years or so, however, the radical left has made some progress in reconstituting itself as a grouping in the European Parliament under the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE/NGL). The non-Communist parties Die Linke, Podemos and Syriza are currently the largest members of GUE/NGL in terms of their respective number of Members in the European Parliament following the 2014 elections to the European Parliament. 
 Whilst the PCP and the KKE have been members of GUE/NGL, they have poor links with non-Marxist-Leninist radical left parties; and party publications criticize GUE/NGL decisions. It was no surprise when the KKE left the GUE/NGL group in 2014. Neither party joined the Party of the European Left, as they rejected the non-revolutionary nature of European level left parties (Charalambous 2013, March and Dunphy 2010). The parties’ strongest international links are with one another and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. 

Organizational structure and practice - Rules of internal procedures
Democratic centralism 
The parties claim to be extremely democratic. For example the PCP claims to have a ‘profound internal democracy’ (PCP 2012). However, researchers have found limited room for debate and that their leaders dominate internal decision making (Keith 2011; Cunha 2008, Eleftheriou 2013). Both parties closely resemble Waller’s ‘orthodox version’ of democratic centralism. This is the area of party activity where the parties have the most in common. The parties have similar internal structures and interpretations of the meaning of democratic centralism. The parties’ constitutions have changed relatively little since the collapse of the USSR.  Interestingly, this section shows that both parties have to some extent ‘tightened’ their organizational structures in recent years. The parties’ leaders have continually rejected calls for internal democratization and have used democratic centralism to resist programmatic reforms. After the 1980s, when a significant number of Central Committee members were reformers, democratic centralism has also been used to ensure the continued promotion of highly orthodox leaders (Keith 2011, Gaspar 1991, Hsyxos 2013). 
In both parties, those who rise up within the party hierarchy usually work as fulltime paid party functionaries and have years of proving their ideological conformity (Bosco 2001: 356). In the case of the PCP, elected officials and trade unionists are also deliberately underrepresented in the leadership, to limit their influence (Keith 2011). The pattern in the KKE is different in the sense that those trade unionists included in leading party organs primarily function as partisans and secondarily as trade unionists (Eleftheriou 2013). 
The parties rigidly impose a single party line and the decisions of higher ranking bodies are binding on lower bodies. Factions are banned and restrictions on ‘horizontal discussion’ between local and regional party organisations largely prevent their formation (PCP 2012, KKE 2013). In the PCP, this was temporarily breached by reformist factions called the Group of Six (1988), the ‘Third Way’ (early-1990s) and the Renavodores -- renovators (late-1990s) (Cunha 2008: 18). Leading reformists were expelled or suspended although most deserted before they could be expelled. Since the late-1990s, there has been even less room for debate within the party (Keith 2011).
In recent years, there have been no ‘known’ factions within the KKE. Reformers largely left the party during the split with SYN in 1991. The leaders of the KKE have also been better than those of the PCP at disciplining dissent before factions could form. The KKE has expelled high-ranking dissidents for questioning the party line, mainly over the relations with SYN and European issues. Factions in the PCP emerged through the moderating influence of connections to the student movement and trade unions (Moreira 2009). Reformers in the KKE also argue that these factors contributed to the development of the reformist wing of the KKE (Hsyxos 2013). 
The two parties have elaborate disciplinary procedures. In the PCP, for example, the leadership and party branches can suspend or expel members that question the party’s interpretation of Marxism-Leninism (PCP 2012). Central Commissions of Control (the Party Control Committee in the KKE) are tasked with exposing, trying and punishing members (Brito 2008).  The KKE temporarily relaxed its internal discipline before the split with SYN as its leaders sought to satisfy those seeking room for debate. However, after 1996 we can identify a hardening of discipline in the KKE as the new orthodox leadership asserted control over the party, and introduced a new stricter party statute.

Membership recruitment, rights and duties
The parties seek to remain ideologically pure and to build their memberships rather than to pursue vote- or office-seeking strategies. The PCP claims to have 60,000 members, down from approximately 75,000 in 2006 (http://ultraperiferias.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/partidos-tem-300-mil-militantes-ps-com.html (​http:​/​​/​ultraperiferias.blogspot.co.uk​/​2013​/​01​/​partidos-tem-300-mil-militantes-ps-com.html​)http://ultraperiferias.blogspot.co.uk/2013/01/partidos-tem-300-mil-militantes-ps-com.html (​http:​/​​/​ultraperiferias.blogspot.co.uk​/​2013​/​01​/​partidos-tem-300-mil-militantes-ps-com.html​)). The KKE, however, does not reveal its membership numbers, reflecting its more introverted style. Recruitment processes in both parties are very strict. In order to promote class consciousness, the parties primarily seek to recruit workers and combine neighbourhood and workplace cells to provide a ‘fundamental link with the working class’ (KKE 2013, PCP 2012). The KKE increasingly emphasizes this approach. Its last Constitution declares that its members are ‘…primarily those who are workers’ (KKE 2013).
Members of both parties must be approved by local cells or organizations (KKE 2013, PCP 2012). In the KKE, Regional Committees must approve those coming from other parties and Central Committee approval is required for former leading members of other parties. Members must also be seconded by existing members who testify for their integrity (two for the KKE, one for the PCP). Members of both parties must have primary responsibility to the party, rather than to affiliated structures or other organizations. 
In both parties, members have demanding duties to: recruit new members, endorse the party programme, defend unity, protect matters relating to internal party affairs, to regularly account for their activity, and to ‘self criticize’ their ideological beliefs (KKE 2013, PCP 2012). Members must also read and circulate party publications: Rizospastis and Kommounistiki Epitheorisi (KKE); Avante! and O Militante (PCP). The KKE has recently reinforced the duties of members. Members not only have to accept the party’s programme but also its ‘ideology’ and cannot support ‘metaphysical dogmas, or religions’ (KKE 2013).
Membership of the PCP can be terminated if the leadership decides that members have been admitted by mistake or if they are not active (PCP 2012). The KKE is more disciplined, with members facing a trial period of one year (recently increased from sixth months). The KKE has also tightened the conditions for the re-admission of members who were expelled or left the party, having found that ‘few actually managed to reintegrate’ (Rizospastis 2013). The KKE’s leadership has also sought to reintroduce powers allowing it to periodically review the party’s membership to ensure that members are suitable. This highlights how in some ways the KKE is more authoritarian and centralist in organizational terms in comparison with the PCP 

The role of the party organs
According to the parties’ official accounts of their internal machinery, lower party organs, like cells and regional meetings, elect over 1000 delegates to national assemblies and congresses (PCP 2012, KKE 2013). Congresses are the highest authority in the parties and elect around 150 members to the PCP’s Central Committee (CC) and sixty six members to the KKE’s CC. The parties claim that after party congresses the CC is their most powerful institution. Vibrant internal debates are said to occur within local branches, regional, district, municipal, parish and trade-based assemblies and affiliated organizations (PCP 2012, KKE 2013).  Members have rights to express themselves in meetings and congresses and to stand for election for all leading positions. 
This form of democracy, however, is in practice centralized and hierarchical. In both parties, local and regional party organizations have little input into policy making, and have little influence on the leadership (Hsyxos 2013, Keith 2010). Both parties have pyramid structures that filter out reformists from party congresses. There has been little debate or criticism of party policy allowed in party publications (Narciso 2007: 21, Eleftheriou 2013; Charalambous 2013).
In the PCP congress delegates are regularly chosen by orthodox local and regional party leaders.​[4]​ Members’ rights are frequently broken as the leadership controls elite advancement, appoints leaders of local organizations and blocks reformers from gaining leading positions (see Keith 2011). Furthermore, debates focus on topics handed down by the leadership; are watched by representatives from higher party organs and dissent is recorded and prohibited once the leadership has taken a decision (Cunha 1991: 336). 
The KKE’s leadership also monitors local level meetings and local leaders are held accountable if they fail to maintain control (Hsyxos 2013; Eleftheriou 2013). A culture of obedience and institutional mechanisms for regulating the selection procedure of congress delegates make it hard for reformers to have influence. Lower party branches and cells do not choose congress delegates but send representatives to a series of regional meetings based on a majority voting system. Even if reformers become influential in some local cells, they are generally unable to gain a majority of support at larger regional meetings in elections for congress delegates. The ban on internal factions means that they cannot communicate with other cells or branches before regional meetings to promote reforms. 
In both parties congress delegates who do criticize the party leadership rarely make it to subsequent congresses (Keith 2011, Hsyxos 2013 and Theonas 2013).  The KKE has not announced expulsions since 2000. However, critics are blocked from leadership positions and are given menial tasks within the party organization until they leave.​[5]​ 
Congress votes on policy and procedural matters are conducted by a show of hands in both parties. This enables the leadership to identify rebels and ensures that delegates see the leadership’s intentions. Choosing party leaders this way was outlawed in Portugal to prevent the PCP’s leaders from influencing the election of subsequent leaderships. This change, however, did little to reduce their control over which delegates make it to congresses. Moreover, congresses in both parties only allow votes on a single draft of the party programme and single list of members of the CC – these are both prepared by the leadership. Working this way provides limited room for amendment and decisions take place with near unanimous votes and little meaningful discussion.
Both parties claim that their CCs run the party between congresses. Officially the members of the parties’ smaller executive leadership bodies are also chosen by the CC.​[6]​ In practice, however, it is the smaller executive institutions that dominate policy making and elite advancement.  In the PCP, the key institutions are the Political Commission (around twenty members) and the more powerful Secretariat (five-nine members). In the KKE the most important institution is the Political Bureau (around ten members). In both parties the membership of these institutions changes very gradually, typically by around ten percent following a party congress (Eleftheriou 2013, Keith 2011).
In the PCP, the Political Commission writes policy documents, drafts the list of members for the next Central Committee, co-ordinates ancillary organizations and elected officials. The Secretariat takes day-to-day decisions (Keith 2011). In the KKE, the Political Bureau runs the party although: ‘There is a view within the party... that the leadership is... not only the Political Bureau, but also the leading core of that body, that is, the Secretary General and the officials who cooperate daily with the Secretary General’ (Theonas 2013). It is common in both parties for decisions taken by the Political Bureau to be uncritically passed by the CC (Theonas 2013). In both parties elected officials are also chosen and tightly controlled by the leadership; in their vast majority, elected officials are members of the Central Committee and employees of the party, or significantly involved in the wider party-affiliated movement. 
For decades, Secretary General Cunhal dominated the leading bodies of the PCP. Subsequent leaders have been less influential (Keith 2011). Both the PCP and KKE now have something resembling collective leaderships with a small group of elites being located around their Secretary Generals. The trend has been to promote relatively weak, uncharismatic Secretary Generals who have been in the leadership for decades to limit the chances of reform. The elaborate formal procedures in the parties also afford little room to party leaders seeking to promote policy change for maneuvers like scholars (Levitsky, 2003) have found in parties in Latin America.  
Both parties relaxed their internal organizations in the early 1990s, before tightening discipline. The KKE temporarily relaxed its structures before the 1991 Congress. A compromise was reached between reformist and the orthodox wings for a process of decentralization to allow local and regional party organizations to form small committees to facilitate debate and the election of congress delegates became more open (Eleftheriou 2013 and Theonas 2013). Both of these provisions were abolished in 1996. A process of centralization occurred at the KKE’s congress in 2013, as the party took steps to abolish its ‘prefectoral’ (district) committees – one of the four levels between party cells and the CC.​[7]​  The PCP’s leaders temporarily gave more room for debate in its intellectual sector in the mid-1990s but otherwise there is little evidence of organisational change or a shift away from democratic centralism in the PCP (Freire and Lisi 2016). 

Organizational structures and practice - Linkage
Trade unions and youth organizations
The parties do not acknowledge the true nature of democratic centralism. However, they are more forthcoming about their relationships with organizations in civil society. The PCP and KKE only make alliances where they can dominate. The parties seek to infiltrate and to influence other organizations rather than engaging in an open-ended dialogue (KKE 2013; PCP 2012).  
The KKE was organizationally weakened from the split with SYN in 1991. Moreover, its youth organization, KNE, experienced a series of divisions and had to be slowly reconstructed during the late 1990s. This left the KKE largely isolated from other organizations in civil society (Maratzides 2009).  Both parties now tightly control their youth organizations and these groups take highly sectarian approaches towards other student/left-wing movements. Since the 1990s, for example, the KKE’s student movement has not sought to develop links with any other left-wing organizations.  The Portuguese student movement merged with PCP youth organization to form the tightly controlled and sectarian Portuguese Communist Youth in 1979 (Keith 2010).
The PCP gained control over the largest trade union in Portugal, the General Confederation of the Portuguese Workers, in 1970 – which is always led by a Communist and follows the wishes of the PCP’s leaders. The KKE has struggled to develop links to civil society, especially after its split in 1991, which is partly due to Greek communists’ pursuit of ideological purity. To this end, it merged its main ancillary organizations: the Student’s Front of Struggle; the Federation of the Women of Greece; the All-Farmers Militant Union; and the organization of small-medium enterprises into the All-Workers Militant Front (PAME), a trade union based around workers’ clubs (Eleftheriou 2011: 81). Research suggests that ‘Candidate selection for nearly all posts in PAME leadership bodies is closely controlled by the CC’ (Tsakatika and Eleftheriou, 2013).  PAME’s activities and protests are shaped by the KKE’s programmatic positions and the Political Bureau has a significant say on appointments and elections within PAME.

Anti-globalization movements
The KKE and PCP played a significant role in social protests against austerity measures during the post-2008 global economic crisis. Both parties, however, generally failed to build links with other left parties or radical left movements (notwithstanding events in late 2012 when the PCP called on its members to join demonstrations at short notice before the start of rallies by the ‘Screw the Troika’ movement). The PCP and to a greater extent, the KKE generally participated independently in protests organized by their own ancillary structures. One reason for this was that both parties give local and regional party organizations little autonomy to make alliances (Hsyxos 2013, Keith 2010). Second, the parties seek to retain their leading role in the struggle against capitalism and to avoid ideological contamination. 
 The KKE is more forceful in its criticism of other non-communist or workers movements.  It argues that violent, quasi-anarchist groups are being driven by the state (Belantis 2009). During the December 2010 and 2012 demonstrations and riots a very critical approach was exhibited by the KKE towards the phenomenon of spontaneistic informality. In contrast to SYRIZA, the party highlighted that such movements, cannot constitute a revolutionary subject and are often in contradiction with the movement of the working class. 
Similarly, the KKE sees the anti-globalization movement as a form of opportunism that underplays the significance of class struggle (Seretakis 2002). The party’s official analysis of the anti-globalization movement is premised on the idea that this movement is too heterogeneous. Consequently, it can too easily be controlled by multinationals or imperialist states, and moves in a reformist direction that avoids addressing the central problems of capitalism. It argues that the movement substitutes class struggle with terms such as globalization (Seretakis 2003; Bellou 2001). The KKE’s statements do not often recognize new social movements, and sexual inequalities, animal rights issues and environmental problems are viewed as side effects of capitalism and approached as conditional upon its dissolution. 
In contrast, the PCP expresses solidarity with anti-globalization protests. It participates in both the World and Portuguese Social Forums and argues that while the anti-globalization movement can distract from class struggle, it provides fruitful ground for promoting socialism (PCP 2009). It also runs a front Green party, albeit not seeking formal links with environmental or other social movements, so as to avoid the dilution of Communism. 

Conclusion
Given that Marxist-Leninist parties have generally been treated as identical, a major finding of this preliminary study is that we need to develop a more nuanced understanding of them. This article has highlighted several important differences between them that need to be explained in order to understand why the European communist movement remains fragmented. In terms of organization the KKE and the PCP have much in common. While the KKE is more centralist, the differences between them relate more to their external relations with civil society than to their internal workings. The parties have been unable to find ways of developing democratic centralism to overcome its historic failings. 
In terms of political behaviour, the parties are generally similar. Both parties have become increasingly isolationist, oppositional, uninterested in building local coalitions and opposed to developing links to other leftist parties at the European level. The main difference we found is that the KKE is more than the PCP unwilling to consider working with other organizations or to discuss possibilities for coalition buildings. 
In terms of ideology, we find a more mixed picture. Though there are a number of similarities, we find an equal number of important ideological differences. The KKE can be classified as being completely untouched by any kind of liberal, red-green or other leftist thinking and as more orthodox and revolutionary. The differences between the policies and ideas that PCP and the KKE reveal exhibit their different understandings of how Marxism-Leninism should be interpreted as an ideology.
Our analysis reveals that the parties have adapted to changing after the collapse of the USSR environment by becoming more orthodox. This process of ‘hardening’ contrasts with most radical left parties.  The KKE, in particular, has become more ideologically orthodox and centralist. This was a gradual process, which started in 1996 and was reinforced at the party’s Congress in 2012. 
Overall, the two parties studied here have enough in common to testify to Marxism-Leninism’s ongoing distinctiveness. Ideological differences between the PCP and the KKE, however, need to be underlined. In particular, the KKE’s cruder approach and theoretical identification with Stalinism stands out. This shows that the ideological fragmentation of the radical left has been even more pronounced than the literature suggests. It also indicates that there is little potential for coordination between Marxist-Leninist parties at the international level. Marxist-Leninist parties or ‘conservative communists’ are in ideological terms a broad church, like other radical left subgroups (March 2011). 
A foundation is provided here for mapping the differences of Marxist-Leninist parties (on a global basis given the regional similarity between our two case studies). It remains for scholars to draw comparisons with other Marxist-Leninist parties and to build a wider understanding of contemporary communism. The framework also presents a basis for comparing other historical strains of Communist and radical left thinking such as Trotskyism, Maoism and attempts to reform Communism.  
We also see a need for explaining why these similarities and differences have emerged.  A number of preliminary insights are apparent. The largely bi-polar party systems in these countries since 1990, combined with majoritarian electoral systems restricted opportunities for mainstream parties to seek alliances with the communists. This may help to explain their hesitance towards office seeking like several other members of the West European Communist party family in the post-war period. 
National constraints cannot, however, entirely account for the differences between the two parties. Both countries experienced dictatorship, yet the KKE is more extreme than the PCP in its use of terms such as ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’ and in its rejection of multi-party politics. Both Greece and Portugal have witnessed a recent upsurge in social movements and compete with rival non Marxist-Leninist, radical left parties, yet the KKE is more fiercely critical of them. The KKE has also gone further in tightening its organizational structure. Both parties operated within electoral arenas characterized by periods of Euro-enthusiasm but the KKE is more aggressive in its rejection of European integration.
These differences can be accounted for with reference to the composition of the parties’ leadership after the events of 1989–1991. The advancement of elites seeking to break with Communism or to adopt reformed notions of Communism to the leadership of the PCP in the 1990s generated a relative pragmatism on ideological matters. In contrast, efforts to promote cooperation with other parties or towards modifying democratic centralism were blocked by orthodox elites. Reformers were excluded from the KKE earlier on and were easily confronted during the 1990s, as the Political Bureau of the party which was composed of hard-liners sought to impose an orthodox, revolutionary and sectarian approach. 
The comparative framework presented here allows us to identify two ideological types of Marxism-Leninism. A perfectionist form, pursued by the KKE through consistent adherence to communist thinking during the revolutionary years of 1917–1922 and defence of Stalinism, and a pragmatic brand which the PCP promotes in the sense of acknowledging other eras of leftist thought and one that is, at least to a limited extent, more tolerant towards other ideological traditions. 

Acknowledgements
The authors thank Costas Eleftheriou and Marco Lisi for feedback on drafts of this article. Additional thanks go to the panel on ‘Exceptionalism and Non-Exceptionalism’, at the 63rd Annual International Conference of the Political Studies 
Association in Cardiff, 25–27 March 2013, where the theoretical framework was presented.

References
Bakker, Ryan, Erica Edwards, Liesbet Hooghe, Seth Jolly, Jelle Koedam, Filip Kostelka, Gary Marks, Jonathan Polk, Jan Rovny, Gijs Schumacher, Marco Steenbergen, Milada Vachudova, and Marko Zilovic. 2015. “1999-2014 Chapel Hill Expert Survey Trend File.” Version 1.1. Available on chesdata.eu. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill.
Backes, U. and Moreau, P. (eds.) (2008) Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht).
Balabanides, Y. (2015) Eurocommunism: From the Communist to the Radical Left (Athens: Polis) (in Greek).
Bale, T. and Dunphy, R. (2011) ‘In from the cold? Left parties and government involvement since 1989’ Comparative European Politics, 9 (3), 269–291.
Belantis, D. (2009) KKE, Rebellions and Bourgeois-Democratic Legality, Theses 107, available at: 
http://www.theseis.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1067&Itemid=29 (​http:​/​​/​www.theseis.com​/​index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1067&Itemid=29​) (accessed: 29 October 2011).
Bell, D. (1998) ‘The Confederal Group of the United Left-Nordic Left’. In D. Bell and C. Lord (eds.) Transnational Parties in the European Union (Aldershot: Ashgate): 131–50.
Bosco, A. (2001) ‘Four Actors in Search of a Role: The Southern European Communist Parties’, in Diamandouros, N. and Gunther, R. (eds.), Parties, Politics and Democracy in the New Southern Europe (Baltimore: John Hopkins): 329–387.
Botella, J. and Ramiro, L. (eds.) (2003) The Crisis of Communism and Party Change: The Evolution of West European Communist and Post-Communist Parties (Barcelona: Institut de Ciències Polítiques Socials (ICPS)).
Bozóki, A. and Ishiyama, J. (eds.) (2002) The Communist Successor Parties of Central and Eastern Europe (New York: Sharpe).
Bull, M. and Heywood, P. (eds.) (1994) Western European Communist Parties After the Revolutions of 1989 (London: Macmillan).
Bull, M. (1995) ‘The West European Communist Movement in the Late Twentieth Century’, West European Politics, 18 (1): 78–97.
Charalambous, G. (2013) European Integration and the Communist Dilemma: Communist Party Responses to Europe in Greece, Cyprus and Italy (Farnham: Ashgate).
Charalambous, G. (2011) ‘All the Shades of Red: Examining the Radical Left’s Euroscepticism’, Contemporary Politics, 17 (3): 299–320
Cunha, C. (2008) ‘Few, But Pure and Good Members, are Preferred to a Mass Party: the Portuguese Communist Party’s Continued Orthodoxy’, in Backes, U. and Moreau, P. (eds.), Communist and Post-Communist Parties in Europe, (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht).
Cunha,  C.  (2003)  ‘‘‘Mais  Portugal!  Mais  CDU!...Mais  PCP?’’  The Portuguese Communist Party at the Turn of the 21st Century’, in J. Botella and L. Ramiro (eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change (Barcelona: ICPS)
Cunha, C. (1992) The Portuguese Communist Party’s Strategy for Power 1921–1986 (New York: Garland).
Cunha, C (1991) ‘The Portuguese Communist Party and Perestroika: Resistance and Reforms’, Current Politics and Economics of Europe, 1 (2): 157–171.
Cunhal, A. (1995) Alvaro Cunhal’s interview to the ‘Quaderni Comunisti’ (PCP: Lisbon). Available at: http://www.pcp.pt/english/ (accessed 20 December 2009).
De Sousa, J. (2008). Opening Speech of the General Secretary to the Eighteenth-Congress of the PCP, Available at: 
	http://www.international.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=6&id=23&Itemid=44 (​http:​/​​/​www.international.pcp.pt​/​index.php?option=com_content&task=category&sectionid=6&id=23&Itemid=44​). (Accessed 1 December 2009).
Dunphy, R. (2004) Contesting capitalism: Left parties and European integration. (Manchester: Manchester University Press). 
Dunphy, R. and Bale, T. (2011) ‘The Radical Left in Coalition Government: Towards a comparative measurement of success and failure’, Party Politics, 17 (4): 488–504.
Duverger, M. (1954) Political Parties (London: Methuen).
Eleftheriou, C. (2011) Party Strategy, Organisational Change and Electoral Mobilisation, Greek Review of Political Science, 37: 69–97.
Freeden, M. (2003) Ideology (Oxford: Oxford University Press (OUP)).
Freire, A. and Lisi, M. (2016 forthcoming) ‘The Portuguese Radical Left and the Great Recession: Old Challenges and New Responses’, in L. March and D. Keith (eds.) Europe’s Radical Left: From Marginality to Mainstream? (London: Rowman and Littlefield). 
Gaspar, C. (1991) Can communists survive communism? Camoes Centre Quarterly, 3
(5).
Gomez, R.; Morales, L. And Ramiro, L. (2016) Varieties of Radicalism: Examining the Diversity of Radical Left Parties and Voters in Western Europe, West European Politics, 39: 351–379.
Guerrero, P. (2012) The anti-imperialist struggle (​http:​/​​/​www.pcp.pt​/​node​/​260934​), Pedro Guerreiro’s Speech, 19th PCP Congress. Available at:
http://www.pcp.pt/node/260934 (accessed 15 May 2013).
Harmel, R. and Janda, K. (1994) ‘An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party 
	Change’, Journal of Theoretical Politics, 6 (3): 259–287.
Hudson, K. (2012) The New European Left: A Socialism for the Twentieth Century (New York: Palgrave).
Hudson, K. (2000) European Communism since 1989 (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
Jalali, C. and Lisi, M. (2012) ‘Quand le changement semble dangereux:
evolution du Parti communiste portugais’, in J. De Waele and D. Seiler Les partis de la gauche anticapitaliste en Europe, (Economica, Paris): 180–204.
Kalyvas, S. and Maratzides, N. (2003) ‘The Two Paths of the Greek Communist Movement (1985–2001)’, in J. Botella, and L. Ramiro, (eds.), The Crisis of Communism and Party Change (Barcelona: ICPS): 13–33.
Kalyvas, S. and Maratzides, N. (2002) ‘Greek Communism 1968–2001’, East European Politics and Societies, 16 (3): 665–690. 
Keith D. (2011) Party Organization and Party adaptation: Western European Communist and Successor parties. DPhil Thesis, University of Sussex. 
Keith, D. (2010) ‘The Portuguese Communist Party – Lessons in Resisting Change’, Working Papers in Contemporary European Studies, No.116, Brighton: Sussex European Institute.  
KKE (2013) The Constitution and Programme of the KKE, Available at: http://www.kke.gr/taytothta/ (accessed 15 June 2013).
KKE (2011a) Essay on the KKE’s History (Athens: Sihroni Epohi).
KKE (2011b) Press Conferences of the General Secretary of the CC of the KKE Aleka Papariga. Available at:
http://www.kke.gr/anakoinoseis_grafeioy_typoy/synenteyksh_typoy_ths_gg_ths_ke_toy_kke_alekas_paparhga_h_syzhthsh_me_toys_dhmosiografoys_13/4/2011?morf=0 (accessed 25 June 2013).
KKE (2009) Decision of the 18th Congress of the KKE for Socialism, Available at: http://www.kke.gr/18o_synedrio/apofash_toy_18oy_synedrioy_toy_kke_gia_to_sosialismo (accessed 10 May 2013).
KKE (2004) The Political Proposal of the KKE to the Working Class (Athens: KKE).
KKE (1996) Materials and Documents of the 15th congress of the KKE (Athens: KKE).
Lazar, M. (2002) ‘The Communist and Extreme Left Galaxy’, in Perrineau, P,
Grunberg, G. and Ysmal, C. (eds.), Europe at the Polls: The European Elections of 1999 (Basingstoke: Palgrave).
Lazar, M. (1988) ‘Communism in Western Europe in the 1980s’ Journal of 
Communist Studies, 4, (3): 242–258.
Lane, D. (1998) ‘Leninism’, in Bottomore, T. et al. (eds.) A Dictionary of Marxist Thought (Oxford: Blackwell): 312–316.
Levant, A. (2012) ‘Rethinking Spontaneity Beyond Classical Marxism: Re-reading Luxemburg through Benjamin, Gramsci, and Thompson’, Critique, 40 (3): 341–361. (​http:​/​​/​wlu-ca.academia.edu​/​AlexLevant​/​Papers​/​1952763​/​Rethinking_Spontaneity_Beyond_Classical_Marxism_Re-reading_Luxemburg_through_Benjamin_Gramsci_and_Thompson​)
Lenin, V. (1969) [1902] What Is to Be Done?: Burning Questions of Our Movement. London: Intl Pub.
Levitsky, S. (2003) Transforming Labour-based parties in Latin America, (Cambridge: CUP).
Liosis (2002) Globalisation: Reality or ideological construction, Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, 2.
Mair P. and Mudde, C. (1998) ‘The Party Family and Its Study’, Annual Review of Political Science, 1: 211–229.
Maratzides, N. and Rori, L. (2010) Changing Goals, Changing Alliances: The KKE and Party Competition in the Post-Junta Period, Epistimi kai Koinonia, 25.
March, L. (2012) Problems and Perspectives of Contemporary European Radical Left Parties: Chasing a Lost World or Still a World to Win?’, International Critical Thought, 2 (3): 314–339.
March, L. (2011) Radical Left Parties in Europe (London: Routledge).
March, L. (2008) Contemporary Far Left Parties in Europe: From Marxism to the Mainstream (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung).  (​http:​/​​/​www.fes.de​/​ipa​/​inhalt​/​monitor.php​)
March, L. and Dunphy, R. (2010) The European Left Party and the 2009 European parliamentary elections. Paper presented at the PSA Annual Conference, Edinburgh, UK, 29 March–1 April.
March, L. and Mudde, C. (2005) ‘What’s Left of the Radical Left? The European Radical Left After 1989: Decline and Mutation’, Comparative European Politics, 3 (1): 23–49.
McInnes, N. (1975) The Communist Parties of Western Europe (London: OUP).
Mujan-Leon, E. (1977) ‘The PCP and the Portuguese Revolution’, Problems of Communism, 26: 31–34.
Narciso, R. (2007) Álvaro Cunhal e a Dissidência da Terceira Via, Coimbra: Coimbra.
Narkiewicz, O. (1990) West European Communist Parties in the late twentieth century (London: Routledge).
Olsen, J., Koβ, M. and Hough, D. (eds.) (2010) Left Parties in National Governments (London: Palgrave).
Patricio, M. and Stoleroff, A. (1993) ‘The Portuguese Communist Party: Loyalty to the ‘‘Communist Ideal’’’ in Bell, D. (ed.) Western European Communists and the collapse of Communism (Oxford: Berg).
PCP (2012) Programme and Constitution: Democracy and Socialism, (Lisbon: PCP).
PCP (2010) PCP Programme: Portugal – An Advanced Democracy on the Threshold of the Twenty-First Century (Lisbon: PCP).
PCP (2009) Davos and Belem. Lisbon: PCP. Available at: http://www.pcp.pt/en/davos-and-belem (​http:​/​​/​www.pcp.pt​/​en​/​davos-and-belem​). (Accessed 2 March 2016).
PCP (2004) Seventeenth-Congress CC. Lisbon: PCP. Available at: http://www.pcp.pt/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=20&Itemi d=563. (Accessed 12 November 2009).
Rizospastis (2013) In relation to the Changes in the Proposed Constitution for the 19th Congress, 27 January.
Scarrow, S., Webb, P. and Farrell, D. (2000) ‘From Social Integration to Electoral Contestation’, in Dalton, R. & Wattenberg, M. (eds.), Parties without Partisans (Oxford: OUP): 29–153.
Sassoon, D. (1996) One Hundred Years of Socialism: The West European Left in the Twentieth Century (London: Tauris).
Schakel, A. (2013) ‘Congruence between Regional and National Elections’, Comparative Political Studies, published online October 2011. 
Smith, O. (1993) The Greek Communist party in the post-Gorbachev era, in D.S. Bell (ed.) Western European Communists and the Collapse of Communism, (Oxford: Berg), 87–99.
Seretakis (2003) On the Anti-globalisation Movement, Kommounistiki Epitheorisi, 5. 
Tiersky, R. (1985) Ordinary Stalinism: Democratic Centralism and the question of communist political development (London: Allen and Unwin).
Tsakatika, M. and Eleftheriou, C. (2013) ‘The Radical Left’s Turn towards Civil Society in Greece: One Strategy, two Paths’, South European Society and Politics, 18 (1): 81–99.
Tzialas, G. (2012) The KKE’s Policy of Alliances, 1978–2012, TVXS, Available at: http://tvxs.gr/news/blogarontas/i-politiki-symmaxion-toy-kke-1978-2012-toy-gianni-tzialla (accessed 10 April 2013).
Waller, M. (1988) ‘Democratic Centralism: The Costs of the Discipline’ in M. Waller and Fennema, M. (eds.) Communist Parties in Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation? (Oxford: Blackwell).
Waller, M. (1981) Democratic Centralism: An Historical Commentary (Manchester: Manchester University Press).
Waller, M. and Fennema, M. (eds.) (1988) Communist Parties in Western Europe: Decline or Adaptation? (Oxford: OUP).
Valenta, J. 1989. Coalition strategies and tactics in Marxist Thought, in Coalition Strategies of Marxist Parties, edited by T. Gilberg. Duke University Press, 29–57.
Vernadakis, C. and Mavris, G. (1988) From a “People’s State” to “Change”. Theses, 22.
Verney, S. (2011) ‘An Exceptional Case: Party and Popular Euroscepticism in Greece’. South European Politics and Society, 16 (1): 51–79.
Von Beyme, K. (1985) Political parties in Western democracies (New York: St Martin’s Press).

Interviews
Theonas, G. (2013) (Author interview), 5 June.
Eleftheriou, C. (2013) (Author interview), 10 July.
Hsyxos, K. (2013) (Author interview), 10 May. 
Brito, C. (2008) (Author interview), 25 October. 








^1	  Portugal had been ruled by the conservative and authoritarian Prime Ministers António de Oliveira Salazar (1932-1968) and subsequently Marcelo Caetano (1968-1974). The Carnation Revolution started as a military coup by the Armed Forces Movement as groups of military officers opposed the regime. It soon became a popular movement of civil resistance.  The name ‘Carnation Revolution’ stems from the relatively peaceful nature of the revolution and the way in which soldiers wore carnations because the flowers were placed in soldier’s rifles. 
^2	  We thank Antonis Balasopoulos for this insight.
^3	  The KKE’s more sectarian approach is highlighted by its criticisms of the PCP for meeting with representatives from the ‘opportunist’ BE in 2011–12 (KKE 2011b).
^4	  Reformers including Carlos Brito were unable to overhaul this process in the PCP during the 1990s (Brito Interview). 
^5	  In 2000, cases included Vassilis Kalamatianos, Stratis Korakas, who were not elected to the CC, and Orestis Kolozof and Spyros Striftaris, who were not elected to the Political Bureau. In 2009, critics of the party’s ideology and relations with other parties were not elected to the leadership: including Gerasimos Aravanis, Antonis Skillakos, Elias Leggeris and Spyros Halvatzis. 
^6	  In the PCP the CC chooses its Central Commission of Control. In the KKE, recent changes mean that members of this body, except its secretary, are appointed by the Political Bureau.
^7	  The KKE’s CC retained the power to form prefectoral committees on an ad hoc basis. 
